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INTRODUCTION
Erupted in 2011, the Syrian conflict has resulted mil-
lions of displaced people who have spread into its neigh-
boring countries. Among those countries, Lebanon, whose
geographic position direct to the Syrian border, has be-
come the second largest recipient country in the Middle
East, after Turkey, for a large number of the refugees
(Weaver, 2017). Until 2018, there were more than 1.5 mil-
lion Syrian refugees resided in Lebanon. Out of this num-
ber, only 991,917 were registered by UNHCR, while the
remainders were considered illegal because they could not
fulfill the required documents (UNHCR, 2017). Looking
at the number of population which reached 4 million in
total, with an additional 1.5 million refugees, has turned
Lebanon as a country with the highest concentration of
refugees per capita in the world. It means, one-fifth of
people in Lebanon is refugee, or 173 people out of every
1,000 Lebanese are refugees. This considerable number
has further contributed to the changing of demographic
order in Lebanon (McCarthy, 2017).
Discussing the issue of refugee in Lebanon and how
the issue has been securitized is fascinating. Since the first
arrival of Syrian refugees, this country has implemented a
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Abstrak
Tulisan ini menganalisis kebijakan Lebanon terhadap pengungsi Suriah yang ada di negaranya. Konflik berkepanjangan di Suriah berdampak
pada gelombang pengungsi skala besar yang menyumbang penambahan 1,5 juta jiwa terhadap 4,5 juta penduduk Lebanon. Di saat negara
Timur Tengah lain seperti Yordania dan Turki merespon dengan menerima kedatangan pengungsi tersebut, Lebanon mengambil langkah
sebaliknya. Melalui analisis dengan teori sekuritisasi dan hubungan antara migrasi dan keseimbangan demografi dapat dipahami bahwa
Pemerintah Lebanon menggunakan strategi speech of act dalam melakukan sekuritisasi. Speech of act dilakukan melalui diskursus politik dan
peran media dalam menggambarkan pengungsi sebagai ancaman yang membutuhkan tindakan khusus untuk menanganinya. Lebanon juga
menggunakan isu perubahan demografi, keseimbangan sektarian, dan ancaman munculnya konflik baru, sebagai isu yang mengancam
stabilitas dan keamanan domestik Lebanon.
Kata kunci: sekuritisasi, pengungsi, Lebanon, Suriah, speech of act, media.
Abstract
This paper analyzes Lebanese policy towards Syrian refugees within their country. The prolonged conflict in Syria has generated a large-scale
influx of refugees that contributed to the addition of 1.5 million to 4.5 million Lebanon population. While other Middle Eastern countries
such as Jordan and Turkey responded by accepting the arrival of these refugees, Lebanon took the opposite response. Through the analysis
of securitization theory and the nexus between migration and demographic balance, it can be understood that the Lebanese Government
uses a speech of act strategy in conducting securitization. Speech of act is carried out through political discourse and the role of the media
in portraying refugees as an existential threat that require special measure to handle them. Lebanon also uses the issue of demographic
change, sectarian balance, and the emergence of the new conflicts, as issues that threaten Lebanon’s domestic stability and security.
Keywords: securitization, refugee, Lebanon, Syrian, speech of act, Media.
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more restrictive policy compared to its neighboring host-
countries, such as Jordan and Turkey. While Jordan and
Turkey have built an official refugee camp, Lebanon was
taking the opposite policy. The condition is also exacer-
bated by the actions of Hezbollah, the largest Shiite politi-
cal and military group in the country, which also acts as
the parties who support the Basher al-Assad regime. As
happened in 2017, Hezbollah decided to repatriate hun-
dreds of Syrian refugees to their home country (Abdullah,
2017). Nonetheless, the geographical proximity, the simi-
larity of language, and a large number of Syrians who had
previously worked in Lebanon made this country as the
main destination. As a result, many refugees lived amid
Lebanese society while the others paid rents for housing
or built an informal camp (Favier, 2016).
This paper aims to provide an analysis of the Syrian
refugees presence in Lebanon and its impact on the demo-
graphic change in the country. The main purpose of this
study is to find the strategy of the Lebanese government in
dealing with the issue, which later generates the
securitization towards Syrian refugees. This study applied
the methods of qualitative approach to address the prob-
lem of the study. To discuss, this article starts with the
theoretical framework.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The security studies of migration and refugee have risen
along with the increasing concern of relationship between
refugees as victims of forced migration and the issue of
population growth, and also between the demographic
changes and the emergence of new conflict in the host
country. Nevertheless, many others have seen refugees as
victims of violent conflict. By the increasing pattern of
forced migration to the host country, many latent conflicts
are found in the host country and this is related to the
presence of a large number of refugees in the country. This
migration pattern, according to Champion (1994), has a
significant impact on changes in number, composition,
and distribution of populations in both origin and host
country.
Salehyan (2006), one of many who sees the interna-
tional migration in general and the migration of refugees
in particular, will inflict the security consequences between
and within countries. In this case, the massive waves of
refugees are not only seen as victims of violent conflict but
also as a group who contributes to produce conflict in the
host country. Salehyan mentioned several factors on how
the arrival of refugees in large numbers is seen as a secu-
rity threat to the host country (Salehyan, 2008).
First, refugees are considered as those who can bring
up rebels, new militants, and ideologies from their home
countries, and this is assumed as facilitating the emergence
of conflicts between refugees and local citizens. Second,
refugees can be the parties who participate to oppose the
domestic government in the host country, especially when
the opposition and the majority of refugees have the same
ethnic background and political views. Third, large num-
bers of refugees can contribute to the change of sectarian
balance in the host country, especially when the stability
of a particular country depends heavily on the ethnic bal-
ance. Fourth and last, refugees can be a source of new
conflicts related to economic balance. When the host coun-
try condition is unstable and has limited natural resources,
then the struggle between refugees and local citizens of
occupation, food and water access, housing, land, and so
forth will be seen as a threat to the national security of the
host country.
Furthermore, another statement which still relates to
the influx of refugees contribution in the demographic
changes, Nichiporuk (2000) believes in a certain condi-
tion, the refugees could contribute to create security prob-
lems in the host country. Forced migration pattern is
greater in increasing security threats directly, compared to
migration that is solely carried out for economic reasons
(irregular migration) (Nichiporuk, 2000). Some factors
mentioned by Nickiporuk (2000) are, first, refugees bur-
dened the citizens’ infrastructures and natural resources.
It impacts on the economic problems and the effective-
ness of resources usage. Second, groups of refugees who
affiliate with minority groups in the border areas of the
host country can threaten the emergence of separatist
groups. Third, the existence of refugees in areas with less
local citizens will make the refugees capable of fully con-
trol the area. It is worried to minimize the role of local
citizens. Fourth, refugees can change the order of ethnic
balance in the host country. Fifth, refugees are feared to
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bring the effect of their home country’s conflict, so it will
trigger a new source of conflict in the host country.
In this case, similar to Salehyan, Krcmaric (2014) re-
veals how the influx of refugees in the host country can
affect the demographic balance which impacts on the
changes of long-established ethnic balance. This condition
is very vulnerable that possibly creating potential conflicts
between refugees and local citizens. The potential conflict
will only subside when refugees have returned to their home
country. But then, in fact, in many cases the return of
refugees to their home country is hard to realize and takes
a long time.
The perception of refugees as threats of stability and
security in the host country is similar with the securitization
theory, carried out by a group called as Copenhagen School
such as Barry Buzan (1998), Ole Weaver (1998), and
Thierry Balzacq (2011). According to Buzan and Weaver,
securitization is “... seen as a more extreme version of
politicization. In theory, any public issue can be located
on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized to securitized
(meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat,
requiring emergency measures and justifying actions out-
side the normal bounds of political procedures” (Buzan et
al., 1998: 23). From the definition, politicization and
securitization have different contexts of understanding. In
this case, Buzan and Waever view securitization as an ex-
treme form of politicization.1
Securitization is a result of securitizing actors’ construc-
tion, in portraying an issue as an existential threat or in
other way of a non-dangerous issue. Therefore, the issue
which actually can be handled in the normal and usual
way is solved in a special way. In a securitization, an issue
which is considered as a security threat will become a pri-
ority. The actors who carry out securitization will use meth-
ods beyond the normal procedures. According to Buzan
and Waever, the securitization will success only if the com-
munity (audience) perceive and acknowledge the issue as
a security threat. If the ‘existential threat’ only concedes
by securitized actors, that is not securitization but a
securitization move (Buzan et al., 1998).
Furthermore, the success of securitization can be un-
derstood through these three factors (Buzan et al., 1998).
First, the issue has created an existential threat. Second,
the need for emergency efforts to deal with (emergency
action), and third, the efforts made to solve the issue is
done by violating the official political rules. In addition,
the securitizing actor is generally using the speech act meth-
ods to implement the securitization (Buzan et al., 1998).
Buzan and Waever state the success of the speech act is a
combination of language and society. Language by its in-
trinsic features, and people who will authorize and justify
the speech. In terms of the speech act, Balzacq concluded
the basic idea of speech act can be simply expressed by
certain statements that carried out with more depiction of
the existing conditions of reality (Balzacq, 2011).
Therefore, according to Buzan and Waever, there are
three actors that should be comprised in securitization:
securitizing actors, referent objects, and functional actors
(Buzan et al., 1998). Securitizing actors are those who
securitized by making the existential threat as a threat to
the existing entity. They generally refer to individuals or
groups that securitize through their speech act. In this case,
political elites, government officials, lobbyists, and enforce-
ment groups are the category of securitizing actors. The
next actor is referent objects, the object that will be threat-
ened if the issue is not promptly addressed by special mea-
sure. They generally refer to nation-states, communities,
and territories. The last actor is functional actors, the par-
ties who are not directly involved but affect the dynamics
of securitized issues.
In line with Buzan and Waever, Balzacq also sees that
securitization comprises three things such as referent ob-
jects, securitizing actors, and functional actors, but he
added an additional criterion: the audience as an effort to
securitize (Balzacq, 2011). He said the audience, the pub-
lic or society, has an important position in securitization
theory. As Buzan et al. previously stated, securitization is
an inter-subjective process, even the success of securitization
is very depended on audience approval (Balzacq et al., 2016).
Due to the securitization process, not only does Watson
see political actors as initiators in securitization but also
believes that in some cases, media agents can be initiators
and transmitters of the securitization process (Bourbeau,
2011). In addition, Vultee in Balzacq (2016) argued about
the process, securitization is inseparable from the role of
the media through its ‘framing’ that can be an initiator of
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the securitizing moves.
Furthermore, the forced migration issue is often asso-
ciated with securitization.2 According to Hammerstad,
securitization towards migration issue is an effort of how
people try to maintain their rights from the ‘outsiders’
where their numbers and differences are seen as an exis-
tential threat to the communal identity and the rights of
the local community (Hammerstadt, 2014). Similar to
Hammerstad, Huysman argued the efforts to free up them-
selves from the existential threats (outsiders), forms what
is called as ‘political community of insecurity.’ It means
the securitization of refugees will shape political trust, lo-
yalty, and identity through the distribution of fear and in-
tensification of alienation. So it takes an effort to free them
up from the existence of the threat (Huysmans, 2006).
In terms of this case, the theory of securitization is very
compatible to explain the relationship between forced
migration and demographic changes in triggering the
securitization actions carried out by the Lebanese govern-
ment towards Syrian refugees. The securitization theory
will be used to explain how Lebanese government and
media act as securitizing actors try to make the issue of
forced migration, such as an existential threat that could
threaten the stability of Lebanese security (referent object),
and how those securitizing moves can be accepted by Leba-
nese who act as the audience.
RESULT AND ANALYSES
THE POLICY OF NO POLICY
Since the first arrival, Lebanon played an ambiguous
policy to Syrian refugees. At first, Lebanon was praised by
the international community for its generosity in accept-
ing refugees with an ‘open door policy.’ However, in 2014
the government launched restriction policy by closing the
border in order to reduce the number of incoming refu-
gees. Since that time, the policy of no policy has been imple-
mented and the refugee issue has been securitized.
Syrian refugees previously could enter Lebanon either
to dwell or work by showing their ID cards without any
restrictions. Only after 2014, the government under Gen-
eral Security Directorate (GSD) launched a surprising
policy that every Syrian who enters Lebanon were required
to fill out some documents and explained the reason for
arrival besides humanitarian reasons. This policy conti-
nued in early 2015 when Lebanon required Syrian to re-
new their residents permit by paying US$ 200 annually.
Syrian refugees who were not listed in the United Nations
High Commissioner of Refugee (UNHCR) were obliged
to find Lebanese sponsor who will act as their ‘guardian’
to gain a legal authorization of work and live (HRW, 2016a).
For refugees who were already listed in UNHCR must sign
a pledge that they agreed to not apply for work in the host
country and if they violated the agreement, they would be
deported (HRW, 2016b).
Lebanese government’s policy towards the refugees is
closely related to the severe past when Palestinian refugees
arrived in Lebanon since the Arab-Israel conflict emerged
in 1948. It has been decades since their first arrival, but
the Palestinian refugees remain in Lebanon. This experi-
ence has influenced Lebanon’s government in deciding
refugees issue in order to avoid a similar situation. There-
fore, Lebanon decides to apply the ‘No Camp’ policy that
the country does not build formal camp for refugees re-
mains in Lebanon. The consequence is that many Syrian
refugees build informal camps or rent an apartment or
dorm. ‘No Camp’ policy exacerbates the refugees’ situa-
tion and condition because they are vulnerable with ex-
ploitation and extortion by their landlords, sponsors, even
bosses (Favier, 2016). The security risk of non-formal shel-
ter policy also complicates the humanitarian agency to dis-
tribute the aids.
Mencutek (2017) described the absence of policies and
efforts from the Lebanese government as policy paralysis.
It is the condition of the government unable to form and
apply a certain policy program. This is due to the lack of a
clear commitment from the political elite to form a set of
rules for public relations and policies that can be agreed
upon by all parties (Mencutek, 2017). Since 2005, Leba-
non has experienced political polarization. The political
block was divided into two, March 14 Alliance and March
8 Alliance. The existence of political polarization, along
with the country historical events that suffered a lot of
civil wars caused by ethno-religious issues, was caused dif-
ficulty in gaining consensus among the Lebanese political
elite that has been adhering the ‘confessional’ government
system.
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The absence of an explicit central government position
and efforts to solve refugees cases has made the munici-
palities elaborate their respective policies and rules. The
absence of a fixed policy from Lebanon is also based on
the perception of the refugees’ existence will not last in an
extended period, as what had happened to Palestinian refu-
gees in Lebanon. However, the absence of conflict resolu-
tion to end the prolonged Syrian conflict makes Syrians
still come to the Lebanese border to seek protection al-
though it is a dangerous route.
The absence of a fixed policy to handle the refugees
was caused by the absence of efforts to carry out durable
solutions. It is also based on the assumption that the crisis
of refugees will only take place in a short period. More-
over, the government more focuses on maintaining the
stability of foreign investment rather than formulating stra-
tegies to solve the protracted humanitarian crisis (Atallah
& Mahdi, 2018). In the protracted refugee situation, the
durable solutions such as voluntary repatriation, resettle-
ment, and local integration are needed to apply to prevent
the recurrence case of Palestinian refugees that had been
settled in Lebanon for decades.
THE DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES
The existence of numerous Syrian refugees has con-
tributed to the change of demographic order in Lebanon
(McCarthy, 2017). The facts show how the exodus of Sy-
rian refugees to Lebanon led to the population growth
and changes the demographic aspects of the country. In
the case of Lebanon, demographic change was substantial
to be learned, because it has a profound effect on Lebanon’s
security, political, and economic stability. It is caused by
Lebanon adoption to a particular rule known as
confessionalism (Nordström, 2017). As part of the conso-
ciational form of the government system, confessionalism
refers to a regulation over the division of power between
various sects within a country. That is, the seat of govern-
ment is arranged based on the demographic distribution
of ethno religious groups in Lebanon (Dekmejian, 1978).
Based on Lebanese 1943 constitution, demographic con-
ditions showed that Maronite Christians dominated 54%
of the population, followed by 44% Muslims and the other
2% consisted of other ethnic groups. Furthermore, the
constitution mentioned that Lebanese President should
come from Maronite Christian, the vice-president origi-
nates from Shiite Muslims, and the prime minister comes
from Sunni Muslims (Khouri, 2017a).
Powers division that represents the demographics of
each ethnic group is taken to create a sectarian balance, in
order to avoid any division caused by the sectarian con-
flict. It shows how the demographic balance based on the
sectarian group has a significant position because it dra-
matically influences the security and stability in Lebanon
(Turbay, 2015). However, the current condition indicates
that the demographic balance begins to change as the Sy-
rian refugees enter Lebanon. With 95% of the majority of
Syrian refugees coming from Sunni, the current condition
has changed the ethnic balance whereas Sunni dominates
the population that encompasses 54% of Lebanon total
population (Turbay, 2015).
Besides the changes in sectarian and political balance
mentioned above, Syrian refugees contribute to the change
of economic order in Lebanon. It relates to job opportu-
nities between refugees and local citizens. The existence of
Syrian refugees is considered as a source of problems that
caused the rising prices of basic needs, electricity and gas,
and increased the number of unemployment in Lebanon.
It also impacts on the struggle for health access, educa-
tion, and other public facilities, between refugees and lo-
cal citizens (Sahin, 2015).
SECURITIZATION OF SYRIAN REFUGEE
The perception change toward refugees to as a threat
for national security cannot be separated from the role of
political elite and media in Lebanon (Dionigi, 2016). The
shifting of Lebanon policy impacted on the changing of
Lebanese perception toward refugees. Initially, the Leba-
nese showed their sympathies towards refugees, but then,
this perception changed when refugees were considered as
burdens and dependents to Lebanon as a whole. Since
that time, refugees were seen as a source of instability to
national security. They were also often used as scapegoats
for various problems experienced by Lebanon.
The policy ambiguity towards refugee cases has made
the municipalities elaborate on their policies. In response
to this ambiguity, several cities in Lebanon made unila-
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teral policies and a curfew policy for refugees. This en-
forcement was a form of public fear of perception that
refugees were the source of insecurity in Lebanon (Khatib,
2014). This enforcement was also based on the absence of
a fixed policy from the Lebanese government about refu-
gees. For example, the municipalities of Mount Lebanon
has set banners containing restrictions that prohibit refu-
gees from leaving in the afternoon to morning (Mourad,
2017). The form of fear and rejection from the citizens was
proved from leaflets, brochures, and pamphlets contain-
ing denials and threatening sentences to refugees, and the
desire of local citizens for refugees to return to their home
countries (Khatib, 2014).
Furthermore, the dispute between refugees and local
citizens also caused by the limited number of job opportu-
nities. It was because the unemployment rate was still rela-
tively high in Lebanon and the numbers of job seekers in
low-level sectors were also high. Seeking a job for refugees
was difficult because they had to compete with subordi-
nate local citizens. Moreover, the high numbers of refu-
gees increased the government’s budget and decreased the
country’s average income because it depended on total
income and populations size (Christopersen &
Thorleifsson, 2013). The perception of refugees as a threat
is seen from how they were called as ‘time bombs.’ They
were considered as a threat of terrorism because the camps
of refugees were referred to a source of militants who em-
braced extremism. It could explode any time, and that was
supposed to threat Lebanon’s national security (Daily Star,
2016).
Henceforward, refugees are considered as a threat to
Lebanon’s stability and security. The perception of refu-
gees as a security threat cannot be separated from the state-
ment expressed by the Lebanese political elite. There are
seven political parties in Lebanon and each of them has
different sectarian ideologies: Kataeb (Christian), Future
Movement (Sunni), Lebanese Forces (Christian), Progres-
sive Socialist Party (Druze), Free Patriotic Movement (Chris-
tian), Hezbollah (Shiite), and Amal Movement (Shiite). The
findings conducted by Atallah and Mahdi (2018) revealed
that it was rhetoric of the majority parties in Lebanon that
actualized a common sentiment and presumption, so the
refugees were considered as burdens on the economy and
infrastructure, and thus exceeding Lebanon’s capacity to
accommodate them.
Lebanese’s Former President Michael Suleiman in 2013
said, “It is not just a matter of material help and relief—the
geographic and demographic capacity is saturated and the
problem is the massive numbers of affecting us socially
and economically and on security” (Stott & Nakhoul,
2013). Suleiman also said the refugee problem had become
a burden for Lebanon, by associating it to the number of
refugees that affected Lebanon demographic conditions,
“The problem of the Syrian refugees constitutes a pressing
additional burden on the general situation in the country,
as their numbers have grown up to one-fourth of the popu-
lation of Lebanon” (Turbay, 2015: 19). Lebanese Foreign
Minister in 2014, Gebran Bassil, stated there was an as-
sumption that the refugee existence had a potential to cre-
ate rebel and militant groups as well as was in Syria, and it
was considered as an existential threat to Lebanon secu-
rity (Kholaif, 2014). Meanwhile, Lebanese Prime Minister,
Saad Hariri, expressed his concern about the dispute bet-
ween local citizens and refugees, by his reason that they
generally live in the midst of local citizens, “Today, if you
go around the most host communities, there is huge ten-
sion between Lebanese and the Syrians ... I fear civil un-
rest” (Al-Jazeera, 2017).
Perception of refugees as a threat is not a new thing in
international security studies. The interest in the study of
refugees and migrations has significantly grown in the post-
cold war period (Hammerstadt, 2014). It is in line with
the progress in the development of security studies. While
the study previously emphasized the state-centrism ap-
proach, now it shifts to human-centered security studies
by focusing the individual as the objects of the study. The
shift of the object of study has made the issue of migra-
tions and refugees as a major discussion in the scope of
security studies.
Lebanon has neither ratified the 1952 Refugee Con-
vention nor its 1967 Protocol. Nevertheless, the concept
of non-refoulement has obliged the country to not expelled
refugee when their lives are threatened. Thus, the concept
of non-refoulement has become an internal customary law.
It means the principle compels not only the country that
ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention but also the coun-
JURNAL HUBUNGAN INTERNASIONAL
VOL. 7, NO. 2 / OKTOBER 2018 - MARET 2019184
try that did not do it; all countries must respect the prin-
ciple. Moreover, Lebanon has signed the victim protection
protocol of international armed conflict and various hu-
man rights charters which it obliged them to respect the
rights of refugee as a human. Thus, providing wide-range
rights to refugee becomes an obligatory and the resipient
country should not require them to be a citizen of the
country to obtain these rights (Turbay, 2015). This consid-
eration made Lebanon must not to heed the issue of Sy-
rian refugees.
THE ROLE OF LOCAL MEDIA
Nowadays, media has a significant role in reporting the
situation related to humanitarian crisis. In the case of refu-
gees and immigrants, the media has an essential role in
constructing public opinion and sparks debates over the
refugees existence. Media plays a major role in construct-
ing and promoting a particular standpoint of the issue
(Esses et al., 2013). Besides, the media describes the refu-
gees condition and situation from the ‘humanitarian’ view-
point. Many media prefer to see refugees as a burden and
threat than to see them based on the fact that they are the
ones that should be protected.
In many host-countries which accept numbers of refu-
gees, the media tends to create negative perception towards
the refugees and migrants. It happens because refugees
are considered as a threat for local citizens (Esses et al.,
2013). This is what happens to the refugees in Lebanon
when the media and political elite played a considerable
role in constructing public opinion and perception towards
refugees. It is because of the political elite has a strong
affiliation, so the most of media become the representa-
tion of certain political groups (Abu-Fadil, 2015a). This is
similar to the television stations in Lebanon which mostly
owned by sectarian political parties or a number of busi-
ness people who have strong political ambitions. It also
happens to the Lebanese newspapers which generally
owned by elite families which usually used it as a tool of
propaganda (Abou-Zahr, 2017). All of these become worse
with local laws that impose difficult rules for independent
journalists to establish their own newspapers. Finally, re-
porting profitable news of particular parties becomes un-
avoidable and it certainly violates the journalist code of
ethics (Abou-Zahr, 2017).
As stated in a headline of the Daily Assafir “The
Patriation/Naturalization Choice: Syrians or Palestinians?”
and in other media, Al-Joumhouriya, who writes headlines
“Before Lebanon Becomes a Depot for War Refugees”
(Abu-Fadil, 2015b), likewise the headlines in one of the
print media, An-Nahar, that has been criticized for show-
ing a racist report when describing how the Hamra Dis-
trict, which once known for its beauty and diversity, turned
from Hamra (red) to black because it was invaded by ‘dark-
skinned Syrian’ (Abu-Fadil, 2015a; El-Behairy, 2016). Ac-
cording to El-Behairy, the two major media in Lebanon,
An-Nahar and As-Safir, routinely portrayed Syrian refu-
gees as a threat and being a burden to Lebanon. On the
other hand, it is hard for refugees to speak up because the
journalists generally do not interview many Syrian refu-
gees. The journalists only describe the refugees as time,
statistics, and associate it with the cost problem (El-Behairy,
2016).
Moreover, the use of ‘displaced’ rather than ‘refugee’
term which widely lists in media and delivers in television
broadcasts, illustrates the common perception that Syrians
in Lebanon are not categorized as refugees. In the same
case, the use of the words ‘the other’ refers to refugees,
shows the existence of discrimination in emphasizing that
refugees were categorized as an alien that is different from
Lebanese society. The status quo mentioned above has
proved what once expressed by Watson that the media in
Lebanon, besides act as an initiator, it also played as a trans-
mitter in the process of securitization executed by the Leba-
nese political elite. The media framing in seeing Syrian
refugees as a threat in Lebanon, it demonstrates how the
media contributes to the process of the securitizing move.
FORCED REPATRIATION?
In the midst of uncertainty and the prolonged refugee
case, the debate emerged among the Lebanese political
elite to repatriate refugees back to Syria in the mid-2017
(Francis, 2017a). This was considered as one of the fastest
ways to resolve the prolonged refugee situation. The idea
for repatriation was vocally conveyed by Minister of For-
eign Affairs, Gebran Bassil who has been actively voicing
the repatriation of Syrian refugees since 2013. This was
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also supported by Hezbollah which was the spearhead in
negotiating with the Syrian regime to return their citizens
to Syria.
Furthermore, the intention of repatriation increased
when the Lebanese government, military groups, and the
Kataeb Party proposed the establishment of ‘safe zones’
which were supervised by the international community
and the United Nations along the Lebanese-Syrian bor-
der. The establishment of ‘safe zones’ required several con-
ditions to be established such as declaration for no-fly
zones, arms trajectory, an agreement between all parties
and groups involved in the Syrian civil war in ensuring
security in the specified area (Atallah & Mahdi, 2018). In
relation to repatriation, ‘safe zones’ were used as an excuse
for the Lebanese government to show that the repatria-
tion process was done by examining the security condi-
tions with full considerations. However, there were par-
ties who disagree with the establishment of ‘safe zones,’
one of them was UNHCR through its High Commissioner
revealing “Let us not waste time planning safe zones that
will not be set up because they will not be safe enough for
people to go back” (Francis, 2017b).
At the end of 2017, Lebanon began to repatriate the
first wave of refugees back to Syria. The repatriation car-
ried out through an agreement between the Hezbollah and
the anti-Assad regime in Syria, Saraya Ahl al-Syam. Amidst
the repatriation, Hezbollah said to have held talks and
obtained agreement with the Lebanese government and
the military (Abdullah, 2017). Through the agreement,
prior to the end of 2017, Hezbollah as the largest and stro-
ngest armed group in Lebanon has repatriated tens of thou-
sands Syrian within the boundary area of Arsal City in
Lebanon to the Idlib Province in Northern Syria (Chulov,
2017).
The ongoing repatriation reaps the pros and cons of
whether it was done voluntarily or forcibly. This debate
happened especially between Lebanon and the UNHCR
representative who believed the repatriation process was
not working based on the applicable provisions. UNHCR
believed it was not done based on voluntary principles,
safety, and dignity (Perry et al., 2018). In fact, if we refer to
the durable solution to solve the problem of protracted
refugee, repatriation must be done based on voluntary
principles. Besides, both the host country and home coun-
try have to ensure the repatriation process is carried out
safely and dignity (Long, 2013). Besides Lebanon guaran-
tee the repatriate process undertaken safely without any
coercion and violence, the Syrian government has to think
of reconstruction in the post-conflict situation (Vignal,
2018). If we look at the current condition of Syrian con-
flict which has not found a light path, it is difficult to
make reconstruction efforts before the disclosure of final
conflict resolution for Syria.
Furthermore, Lebanon policies of the repatriation pro-
cess are not appropriate with UNHCR which led to Leba-
non refusal to provide status for Syrian refugees submit-
ted by UNHCR staff. Lebanon also accused UNHCR of
obstructing repatriation efforts. It complained the institu-
tion had instructed the refugees to bravely refuse to be
repatriated if their security and dignity were not guaran-
teed. On the contrary, UNHCR believed the repatriation
was not appropriate with the rules and accused it as a force
action although Lebanon said it was a voluntary action
because most of the refugees do not know their rights in
repatriation agreement.
The Lebanon operation of repatriation was considered
as an action that not commonly used to solve this kind of
problem. The existed perception of refugees as an existen-
tial threat for national security has made various parties in
Lebanon agreed the best and fastest way to resolve pro-
tracted refugees problems was to repatriate the refugees
back to Syria. If it refers to Buzan securitization, Lebanon
action of repatriation was called as an emergency action as
a response to the existential threat towards Lebanon’s se-
curity and stability.
The repatriation did by the Lebanese authorities con-
sidered as inappropriate. It was because the other neigh-
boring countries such as Jordan and Turkey, which also
deal with the numbers of Syrian refugees, did not carry
out the repatriation. Turkey, for instance, received 4.5
million Syrian refugees, while Jordan with 600 thousand
refugees registered by UNHCR since the Syrian conflict
first erupted in 2011. Turkey and Jordan’s attitude that
has not proposed the establishment of safe zones or repa-
triation as Lebanon did could not be separated from real-
ity that repatriation was not possible as long as the con-
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flict in Syria is still ongoing. Due to the existed repatria-
tion rules and procedures, the process should be based on
the aspects of voluntary, safety, and dignity.
CONCLUSION
The perception of refugees as a burden and how their
existence has changed the demographic order in Lebanon
made the country begin to securitize Syrian refugees. Thus,
the securitization was carried out through the strategy of
speech act executed by the political elite in Lebanon. The
Lebanese elite has sparked the discourse to the society and
saw the refugees as existential threat to the stability of Leba-
non. They also often used refugees as scapegoats for vari-
ous problems happened by Lebanon. This Lebanese elite
last action has resulted in the change of Lebanese percep-
tion towards refugees and affected their actions towards
them.
The demographic balance was indeed played a crucial
role in Lebanon. Because it did not only affect Lebanese
population structure but also affected to the ethnic ba-
lance in the country. The exodus of Syrian refugees to Leba-
non led to the population growth and changes the country’s
demographic aspects. The demographic change was sub-
stantial and has a profound impact on Lebanon’s security,
political, and economic stability. The ethnic balance also
played a significant role in the country stability. The his-
tory of Lebanese has witnessed how the civil war mostly
caused by the imbalance of sectarianism in the country.
Prior to the presence of Syrian refugee, the Maronite Chris-
tians dominated the population. Nowadays, the Sunni
Muslim reversed that position and dominated Lebanon’s
ethno-religious group. This kind of change was worried to
provoke the emergence of new conflict in Lebanon. Apart
from the Lebanese elite, media in Lebanon did not only
act as initiator but also acted as transmitter player in see-
ing refugees as a threat and burden for Lebanon. It was
because many biggest media companies in Lebanon were
owned by some Lebanese political elites. Therefore, stir-
ring the media to create a perception of refugees as a bur-
den was not a big deal to maintain the securitization pro-
cess.
Thus, the refugees securitization in Lebanon seemed
to be a success because the local citizens accepted the as-
sumption made by the agents of speech act in seeing refu-
gees as the existential threat and has threatened Lebanon
stability and security. Therefore, extraordinary actions are
needed to apply in order to deal with the issue. The recent
efforts to repatriate refugees back to Syria were the result
of the process of securitization. In this case, repatriation
was portrayed as a special measure to handle an existential
threat. As a form of emergency action, the repatriation of
Syrian refugees has caused considered debate, due to the
fact that the process was carried out by ignoring the as-
pects of voluntarily, safety, and dignity. While the Syrian
conflict is still ongoing, the durable solution to end the
protracted refugee situation is still difficult to be imagined.
ENDNOTES
1 In theory, a public issue can be categorized into several
spectrum ranging from non-politicized, politicized, and
securitization. Non-politicized means that the state does not
look at the issue as something that must be overcome through
public debate or government policy-making. Whereas politi-
cized means that the problem becomes part of public policy
that requires government policy to allocate funds to deal with
the issue. Then in securitization, an issue has been considered
as an existential threat that requires emergency efforts to deal
with (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, 1998; Bourbeau, 2011).
2 The intensity of the study regarding securitization on the issue
of migration has increased significantly following the terrorist
attacks September 11, 2001, in New York and Washington.
The discourse that had appeared in the 1990s regarding the
wave of migration in threatening national security re-emerged
after thus 9/11 incident. Consequently, the issue of migration
then linked to acts of terrorism. This is because the wave of
migration makes immigration control weaker, and thus
allowing the infiltration of actors who are members of the
international terrorism network. Many countries then began to
limit the arrival of migrants and refugees by tightening the
border of their immigration system (Hammerstadt, 2014).
REFERENCES
Abdullah, H. (2017). Refugees Return to Syria from Lebanon in
Hezbollah-mediated Deal. Reuters. Accessed 13 August 2018
from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-
lebanon/refugees-return-to-syria-from-lebanon-in-hezbollah-
mediated-deal-idUSKBN19X1Y6.
Abou-Zahr, S. (2017). Refugees and the Media in Lebanon. Peace
Insight. Accessed 11 August 2018 from https://
www.peaceinsight.org/blog/2017/08/refugees-and-media-
lebanon/.
Abu-Fadil, M. (2015a). Moving Stories: How the Media Cover
Migration - Lebanon. Ethical Journalism Network. Accessed 18
April 2018 from https://ethicaljournalismnetwork.org/resources/
187
publications/moving-stories/lebanon.
Abu-Fadil, M. (2015b). Lebanon: Media Put Humanity in the
Picture as Refugee Crisis Takes Hold. Huffington Post. Accessed
12 August 2018 from https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
magda-abufadil/lebanon-media-put-
humanit_b_8824826.html.
Al-Jazeera. (2017). PM Hariri: Lebanon at “Breaking Point” Due to
Refugees. Al-Jazeera. Accessed 6 April 2018 from https://
www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/saad-al-hariri-lebanon-big-
refugee-camp-170401045951087.html.
Atallah, S. & Mahdi, D. (2018). Law and Politics of “Safe Zones”
and Forced Return to Syria: Refugee Politics in Lebanon.
Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, Policy Papers 43.
Balzacq, T. (Ed.). (2011). Securitization Theory: How Security
Problems Emerge and Dissolve, PRIO New Security Studies.
Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, New York: Routledge.
Balzacq, T., Léonard, S., & Ruzicka, J. (2016). ‘Securitization’
Revisited: Theory and Cases. International Relations, 30(4), pp.
494–531. https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117815596590
Bourbeau, P. (2011). The Securitization of Migration: a Study of
Movement and Order, Security and Governance Series. Milton
Park, Abingdon, Oxon, New York: Routledge.
Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & Wilde, J. (1998). Security: a New Frame-
work for Analysis. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher.
Champion, A. G. (1994). International Migration and Demographic
Change in the Developed World. Urban Studies. 31(4-5), pp.
653–677. https://doi.org/10.1080/00420989420080621
Christopersen, M. & Thorleifsson, C. (2013). Ambivalent Hospitality:
Coping Strategies and Local Responses to Syrian Refugees in
Lebanon, Protection and Human Rights. FAFO Institute for
Applied International Studies.
Chulov, M. (2017). Thousands of Refugees and Militants Return to
Syria from Lebanon. The Guardian. Accessed 12 August 2018
from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/14/
thousands-refugees-militants-return-syria-from-lebanon-
hezbollah.
Daily Star. (2016). Raad: Syrian Refugees in Lebanon ‘A Time
Bomb.’ The Daily Star. Accessed 12 August 2018 from http://
www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2016/Feb-15/
337248-raad-syrian-refugees-in-lebanon-a-time-bomb.ashx.
Dionigi, F. (2016). The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon: State
Fragility and Social Resilience. Accessed 30 March 18 from
http://www.lse.ac.uk/middleEastCentre/home.aspx.
El-Behairy, N. (2016). Burden or Brothers? Media Representations
of Refugees in the Middle East.  Accessed 11 August 2018
from https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-
criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2016/06/burden-
or.
Esses, V. M., Medianu, S., & Lawson, A. S. (2013). Uncertainty,
Threat, and the Role of the Media in Promoting the Dehuman-
ization of Immigrants and Refugees: Dehumanization of
Immigrants and Refugees. Journal of Social Issues, 69, pp.
518–536. https://doi.org/10.1111/josi.12027
Favier, A. (2016). Increasing Vulnerability for the Syrian Refugees in
Lebanon: What’s Next? Middle East Direction. https://doi.org/
10.2870/388671
Francis, E. (2017a). UNHCR Chief Says Safe Zones Would Not Work
in Syria. Reuters. Accessed 16 August 2018 from https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-unhcr/unhcr-
chief-says-safe-zones-would-not-work-in-syria-idUSKBN15I2CO.
Francis, E. (2017b). Lebanese President Calls for Safe Zones in Syria
for Refugees. Reuters. Acessed 16 August 2018 from https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-aoun/lebanese-
president-calls-for-safe-zones-in-syria-for-refugees-
idUSKBN15I1WQ.
Hammerstadt, A. (2014). The Securitization of Forced Migration. In
E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, G. Loescher, K. Long, & N. Sigona (Eds.),
The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration
Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199652433.013.0033
HRW. (2016a). I Just Wanted to be Treated like a Person. Human
Rights Watch. Accessed 2 April 2018 from https://
www.hrw.org/report/2016/01/12/i-just-wanted-be-treated-
person/how-lebanons-residency-rules-facilitate-abuse.
HRW. (2016b). Lebanon: Residency Rules Put Syrians at Risk.
Human Rights Watch. Accessed 2 April 2018 from https://
www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/12/lebanon-residency-rules-put-
syrians-risk.
Huysmans, J. (2006). The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration, and
Asylum in the EU. The New International Relations. London,
New York: Routledge.
Khatib, L. (2014). Repercussions of the Syrian Refugee Crisis for
Lebanon. Carnegie Middle East Cent. Accessed 6 April 2018
from https://carnegie-mec.org/2014/12/10/repercussions-of-
syrian-refugee-crisis-for-lebanon-pub-57442.
Khodr, Z. (2018). Some Syrian Refugees in Lebanon are Going
Home. Al Jazeera. Accessed 12 August 2018 from https://
www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/07/syrian-refugees-lebanon-
home-180709095817350.html.
Kholaif, D. (2014). FM Says Syria Crisis Poses Threat to Lebanon. Al
Jazeera. Accessed 6 April 2018  from https://
www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/03/fm-says-syria-
crisis-poses-threat-lebanon-201432415125385789.html.
Khouri, A. (2017). The Double-edged Sword of a Successful
Securitization: the Trade Off of Human Rights for a Flawed
Sense of Security? The Case of the Securitization of Refugees
from Syria in Lebanon since 2011.
Krcmaric, D. (2014). Refugee Flows, Ethnic Power Relations, and
the Spread of Conflict. Security Studies, 23, pp. 182–216.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2014.874201
Long, K. (2013). The Point of No Return: Refugees, Rights, and
Repatriation, First edition. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford
University Press.
McCarthy, N. (2017). Lebanon Still Has Hosts the Most Refugees
Per Capita By Far [Infographic]. Forbes. Accessed 30 March
2018 from https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2017/
04/03/lebanon-still-has-hosts-the-most-refugees-per-capita-by-
far-infographic/.
Mencutek, Z. S. (2015). Syrian Refugee Crisis Impact on Lebanon.
Project on the Middle East and Arab Spring 10, 10. https://
www.academia.edu/13527838/
Syrian_Refugee_Crisis_Impact_on_Lebanon.
JURNAL HUBUNGAN INTERNASIONAL
VOL. 7, NO. 2 / OKTOBER 2018 - MARET 2019188
Mencutek, Z. S. (2017). From Inaction to Restrictions: Changes in
Lebanon’s Policy Responses to Syrian Mass Refugee Movement.
https://doi.org/10.14282/2198-0411-gcrp-19
Mourad, L. (2017). Inaction as Policy-Making: Understanding
Lebanon’s Early Response to the Refugee Influx – Project on
Middle East Political Science. Project on Middle East Political
Science.
Nichiporuk, B. (2000). The Security Dynamics of Demographic
Factors. Santa Monica: RAND.
Nordström, E. (2017). The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon: Facing
Another Civil War? Accessed 30 March 2018 from http://
urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-69088.
Perry, T., Bassam, L., & McDowall, A. (2018). Lebanon Working for
Return of Thousands of Syrian Refugees: Security Official.
Reuters. Accessed 13 August 2018  from https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-lebanon-
refugees/lebanon-working-for-return-of-thousands-of-syrian-
refugees-security-official-idUSKCN1IW26R.
Salehyan, I. & Gleditsch, K. S. (2006). Refugees and the Spread of
Civil War. International Organization, 60(2), pp. 335-366.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818306060103
Salehyan, I. (2008). The Externalities of Civil Strife: Refugees as a
Source of International Conflict. Americal Journal of Political
Science. 52, pp. 787–801. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-
5907.2008.00343.x
Stott, M. & Nakhoul, S. (2013). Lebanon Says World Must Shoulder
Syrian Refugee Burden. Reuters. Accessed 7 April 2018 from
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/nov/15/
terrorists-isis.
Turbay, M. G. (2015). The ‘Politics of Representation’: Syrian
Refugees in the Official Discourse in Lebanon (2011-2015). The
Netherland: International Institute of Social Studies.
UNHCR. (2017). Syria Emergency. UNHCR. Accessed 30 March
2018 from http://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html.
VanderStoep, S. W. & Johnston, D. D. (2009). Research Methods
for Everyday Life: Blending Qualitative and Quantitative
Approaches. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Vignal, L. (2018). Perspectives on the Return of Syrian Refugees.
Forced Migration Review, pp. 69–71.
Weaver, M. (2017). Syrian Refugees: More than 5M in
Neighbouring Countries Now, Says UN. The Guardian.
Acessesed 2 June 2018 from http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2017/mar/30/syrian-refugee-number-passes-5m-mark-
un-reveals.
